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Abstract 
The paper analyses the impact of tax competition on innovation in the public sector. It is 
shown that the effects of increased mobility of the tax base on innovation and growth 
are ambiguous. The negative relationship is more likely, however. Moreover, it is 
shown that a Leviathan government may be induced to spend a larger share of its budget 
on unproductive activities. 
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1 The issue 
The modernisation of government and public administration has been on the agenda in 
many industrialised countries (and in several developing ones as well) for at least two 
decades. The ultimate objective of this process is a "lean state" or "lean government", 
serving the citizen's needs without excessive bureaucracy and at low costs. Turning a 
bureaucratic government into a lean one involves reorganisation of procedures and the 
introduction of new technologies in order to save resources and produce public-sector 
services more efficiently. In other words: the state must innovate. In practice, this 
innovation includes the introduction of modern management techniques (often adapted 
from the private sector of the economy), the implementationof cost accounting, and the 
use of modern information technologies. See Osborne and Gaebler (1992), for example. 
  What has driven this strive for efficiency? One might argue that it is, at least in 
part, a backlash to the expansion of the interventionist state that many countries 
experienced in the 1960s and 1970s. An additional explanation is that tighter budgets, 
originating from the rise of public debt and, more recently, from demographic pressure 
raising the burden of public-pension expenditures, limit the discretion of policy makers 
and public servants. A third driving force is – arguably – tougher competition amongst 
jurisdictions for mobile factors of production. Since the 1980s, the international 
mobility of factors of production, in particular physical and human capital has been 
increasing substantially, resulting in the accelerating growth of foreign direct 
investment, for example. Capital and other mobile factors, however, constitute 
significant parts of the tax base. With increased mobility, this tax base becomes more 
elastic and high tax rates become less feasible. Thus, the government's monopoly power 
vis à vis the tax base is diminished. The threat that mobile factors leave jurisdictions 
that have high tax rates and mediocre public-sector services and move elsewhere   3
restricts the policy maker's discretion. To avoid the emigration of the mobile parts of the 
tax base, governments must reduce taxes and/or improve the supply of public services. 
With tax revenue being the input and public services the output, the state is forced to 
reduce the input/output ratio of its production process. Public-sector efficiency rises. 
The first authors describing the role of interjurisdictional competition in moving closer 
to the ideal of the lean state are Brennan and Buchanan (1980, ch. 9). In their view, 
interjurisdictional competition is an appropriate means to tame the wasteful Leviathan 
states and replace it by a more efficient one that better serves the needs of the citizen. 
   More  recently,  Keen  (1996) and Rauscher (2000) used formalised tax-
competition models to address the issue and they showed that the results of tax compet-
ition are ambiguous. There are two effects. On the one hand, tax competition raises the 
opportunity cost of the Leviathan's rent seeking behaviour and this contributes to the 
taming of Leviathan. On the other hand, tax competition induces fiscal externalities, 
which is bad and reduces welfare. A limitation of these models is their static nature: 
they derive the effects of an increase in mobility merely on the equilibrium of a static 
economy. However, innovation in the public sector is inherently a dynamic process. 
Instead of merely reacting once to a change in tax-base mobility, the public sector is 
forced to innovate continuously. The question then is whether a change in mobility does 
not only have a one-time comparative static effect, but also induces a permanent rise in 
the rate of innovation and, thus, the rate of economic growth. 
  Thus, this paper poses an old question: is competition good for innovation and 
growth? However, unlike in the standard IO literature on the effects of competition on 
innovation, the object of the following analysis is not the private firm, but the public 
sector. To keep matters simple, I look at a static capital allocation model and combine it 
with a dynamic model of accumulation of "technological" knowledge in the public   4
sector. Of course this is a drastic simplification, but it helps to disentangle competition 
effects from incentives to manipulate the growth path. See Rauscher (2005) for such a 
model where Leviathan's preferences differ from those of the voter such that distortive 
taxation is used to change the growth path. Results turn out to be ambiguous and are 
hardly interpretable in such a general model. Therefore, in order to concentrate on tax 
competition and public-sector innovation, I will neglect private-capital accumulation. It 
will be seen that even with the simplification of a constant capital stock the results are 
by no means trivial, but nonetheless the economic intuition is rather straightforward. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces the model. The 
optimality conditions are derived in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the investigation 
of the impact of parameter changes on innovation and growth and Section 5 contains 
some short remarks on deficiencies of the modelling approach and directions of future 
research. 
 
2 The Model 
Consider a world composed of a continuum of identical and infinitely small juris-
dictions. If the tax base is mobile, the government of a jurisdiction tries to attract it, e.g. 
by lowering tax rates or by supplying better government services. At the end of the day, 
however, governments find out that all of them have taken the same action and the 
location of the tax base remains unaffected. In this paper, we look at a single 
representative jurisdiction that takes the interest rate on the capital market as given. 
Later on, the interest rate will be endogenised via the equality of supply and demand on 
the capital market. The tax base is private capital installed in this jurisdiction, K(t), and 
the policy instrument is a source-based capital tax, Θ(t). t denotes time. As the analysis 
proceeds, the time argument will be dropped for notational convenience where this does   5
not cause ambiguities. Each jurisdiction is endowed with a fixed capital stock K(0)=K0 
and the allocation of capital is – under perfect competition – governed by the marginal-
productivity rule. Assume that output is a function of private capital and a time-
dependent efficiency parameter, A(t), taken as given by private agents. This efficiency 
parameter depends on the supply of public sector-capital. For simplicity assume a linear 
relationship and choose units such that A(t) is public sector-capital. Let the production 
function be A(t)F(K(t)). With r(t) as the world market interest rate, the private sector's 
allocation of capital is determined by  r AF = −Θ '  and it follows that higher tax rates 
induce capital flight: 
   0
"
1
< =
AF d
dK
Θ
. 
As usual primes denote derivatives of univariate functions. The capital-flight elasticity 
of taxation, defined as a positive parameter, then is 
   0
"
>
−
=
AKF
Θ
ε . (1) 
Without interjurisdictional capital mobility, ε  would be zero. ε  is the central parameter 
in this paper and it will be shown how changes in ε  affect the rates of innovation and 
growth in the economy.   
 Private-sector  income,  Y(t), is output plus income from domestic capital employed 
in other jurisdictions minus tax payments: 
  Y () K K K r K AF Θ − − + = 0 ) ( . (2) 
If K0 – K < 0, this indicates that foreign capital is used in the domestic economy such 
that   is the capital income paid to foreigners. Ex post, K ( K K r − 0 ) 0 – K will be zero, but 
ex ante this difference matters.   6
  The government is a wasteful Leviathan and extracts a rent out of the tax revenue. 
In practice, this rent may take the shape of salaries exceeding marginal productivity, 
leisure on the job, and unproductive status seeking in public-sector hierarchies. Let G(t) 
be productive government spending. Then the rent is  
   G K R − =Θ . (3) 
Productive government spending enhances the public sector's capital stock. A is the 
public sector's knowledge capital. It is commonplace to assume that old knowledge is 
needed to produce new knowledge. Let the production of new knowledge be subject to a 
constant-returns-to-scale production function, H(A,G) with positive first derivatives, 
negative second derivatives and a positive cross derivative. Denoting a derivative with 
respect to time by a dot above the corresponding variable, public-sector innovation 
proceeds according to  
   . (4)  ) , ( G A H A = &
For the derivation of some of the results, H(.,.) is specified as a Cobb-Douglas function 
with elasticities α and (1-α) with 0<α<1:  
   . (4') 
α α − =
1 G A A &
This specification is closely related to the one proposed by Jones (1995) for private-
sector innovation in an economic-growth framework. The underlying idea is that an 
increase in existing knowledge indeed reduces the resources needed to generate new 
knowledge, albeit at a declining rate. Jones (1995) shows that the traditional assumption 
on innovation technology, that H is linear in A, which was originally introduced by 
Shell (1966) and is still omnipresent in the economic-growth literature, produces 
unrealistic results. He argues instead that the rate of arrival of new inventions rises at a 
declining rate if the stock of knowledge is increased. In his own words, this   7
"corresponds to the case referred to in the productivity literature as 'fishing out' " (Jones, 
1995, p. 765). Like in many other models used in the economic growth literature, I 
abstract from the stochastic nature of innovation and model H(.,.) as a reduced 
deterministic form of the underlying stochastic process of innovation. Using the 
constant-returns-to-scale property of the H(.,.) function, equation (4') can be rewritten: 
   α − = 




 = 1 , 1 ˆ g
A
G
H A , (4'') 
where the hat above the variable denotes the growth rate and g=G/A. Thus,   is 
the rate of innovation in the public sector. 
α − =
1 ˆ g A
  The government is a utility-maximising Leviathan caring about its rent income 
and about its political support from the voter. The proxy for political support is private 
income. For the sake of tractability, we assume an additively separable iso-elastic utility 
function and a constant discount rate, δ: 
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Ω is a parameter measuring the weight the Leviathan government attaches to political 
support: the larger this parameter, the larger is the impact of the voter on government 
decision making. σ has two meanings. On the one hand, it is the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution. On the other hand, it is the elasticity of substitution between rent income 
and political support. Of course, more general specifications allowing for different 
values of the elasticities are possible, however at the cost of a loss of tractability of the 
model. However, since results turn out to be ambiguous even with the simple 
specification, not much would be gained by using a more general utility function. 
   8
3 Solution 
The Leviathan maximises utility, (5), subject to conditions (1) to (4) and to the 
exogenous initial endowment, A(0)=A0, with respect to Θ and G. It should be noted that 
all Leviathans in all jurisdictions face the same optimisation problem and solve it in the 
same way. Thus, the results derived for an individual jurisdiction generalise to the world 
as a whole.  
 Let  λ(t) be the costate variable or shadow price of public-sector knowledge 
capital, A(t). The current-value Hamiltonian is 
   ( ) () ) , ( ) ( , 0 G A H K K r K K AF G K u λ Θ Θ + − − − − = H  
and the optimum is determined by the following conditions: 
   , (6a)  () F u H Y A − − = λ δ λ &
   R G u H = λ , (6b) 
  
ε
Ω
−
=
1 Y
R
u
u
, (6c) 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and arguments of functions are omitted for 
the sake of expositional brevity. (6a) is a typical canonical equation, driving the 
dynamics of the shadow price. (6b) is the first-order condition with respect to G relating 
the Leviathan's current utility loss from forgoing part of the rent income, uR, to the long-
run gains of spending the savings productively, λHG.  Equation (6c), derived from 
maximisation with respect to Θ, states that capital mobility raises the Leviathan's 
opportunity cost of rent seeking. Without capital mobility, each unit of rent costs Ω 
units of political support. With capital mobility, a tax increase that reduces political 
support by one unit generates less than Ω units of Leviathan rent since higher taxes   9
erode the tax base. Equivalent results can be found in the static models discussed by 
Edwards and Keen (1996) and Rauscher (2000). 
  Due to the assumption of constant returns to scale, the model generates a steady-
state growth path with a constant growth rate. This growth rate equals the rate of 
innovation defined in equation (4''). All relevant variables grow at this rate: 
  ( ) 1 , 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ − = = = = = =
α Θ g g H Y R G A  (7) 
In the equilibrium, in which all jurisdictions choose the same tax rate and the same 
investment path G(t), the remuneration of capital, r, is endogenous. r is determined by 
the capital market equilibrium,  ( ) Θ − = 0 ' K AF r , and grows at the same rate as the 
other variables.  
 Establishing  growth  rates in (6b) and using (6a) to eliminate λ and (6c) to 
substitute for the Leviathan's marginal rate of substitution yields 
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [] δ ε σ − − + = G A H K F G A H g H G A , 1 , ) , 1 0 . (8) 
This is a modified variant of Ramsey's rule of optimum saving. A large discount rate 
reduces the incentive to save and invest and thus reduces economic growth. The term 
() ( G A FH H ) ε − + 1  represents the marginal productivity of knowledge capital in the 
production of new knowledge capital. Its first component is the direct productivity 
effect, HA. There is an additional indirect effect since an increase in knowledge raises 
income at by a factor F and the government can convert this income into productive 
spending, which has an effect HG on capital accumulation. However, due to inefficient 
taxation, this component is diminished by a factor smaller than one depending on the 
capital-flight elasticity, ε. Finally, σ  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and it 
has the usual impact of dampening or accelerating the growth process without affecting   10
sign of the growth rate. Using the Cobb-Douglas specification of the H(.,.) function, 
equation (8) can be rewritten: 
   ( )( ) ( ) δ ε α α σ
α α α − − − + =
− − − Fg g g 1 1
1 1 . (8') 
This equation contains only one unknown, g, and it is independent of the parameter Ω , 
which measures the degree to which voter concern restricts the rent-seeking behaviour 
of the Leviathan government. Thus, the condition determining the level of public 
expenditure appears to be independent of the degree of government discretion. It is 
indeed possible to show that conditions (8) and (8') continue to hold if the government 
is a benevolent welfare maximiser instead of a rent-seeking Leviathan. Thus, we obtain 
a kind of separation theorem: 
Proposition 1 
The optimal choice of productive government expenditure is independent of the 
degree to which the voter's will is taken into account by the government. 
A similar result has been obtained by Rauscher (2000) in a static framework. This 
implies that the government's optimisation problem consists of two separate parts. Both 
a welfare maximiser and a Leviathan will choose efficient paths of productive 
expenditure. However, when it comes to taxation, the Leviathan will use higher tax rates 
in order to finance its own rent income on top of the productive expenditure. The next 
section will show that this conjecture is indeed correct. 
 
4. Effects of capital mobility in productive expenditure and taxation 
Trajectories need to be derived for the control variables, Θ  and G, and the state 
variable, A. Since they grow at the same rate in the equilibrium, the steady state is   11
determined by the ratios of these variables. One of them is g=G/A. The other one will be 
chosen as tax revenue over productive expenditure:  G K / Θ θ = . I start with the impact 
of ε  on g. Equation (8') cannot be solved algebraically but it can be be rewritten such 
that  
   () () α δ ε α α
σ
g F g − − − = 




 − 1 1
1
. (8'') 
The left-hand-side (LHS) of (8'') is increasing or decreasing in g depending on how 
large the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is. If σ is small, the term in brackets is 
positive. If it is larger than 1/α, which is larger than 1, the term in brackets is negative. 
The right-hand side (RHS) is a negatively sloped and convex function of g with a 
positive intercept. This intercept depends negatively on ε. Figure 1 shows the LHS of 
(8'') as a straight line and the RHS as a downward-sloping convex curve. Two values of 
σ and three values of ε  are considered. The following results can be derived 
: (enlarged version of the figure in the appendix) 
•  If  a / 1 < σ , then there is a unique solution of equation (8''). Moreover, it is 
obvious that the equilibrium value of g is reduced if the mobility parameter, ε 
rises.  
•  If  a / 1 > σ , then equation (8'') may have no solution, one solution, or two 
solutions. The single solution is the tangency solution to be seen in the lower 
quadrant in Figure 1. If mobility is large, then there are two solutions for g, the 
g 
LHS 
RHS 
RHS with 
increasing ε 
LHS with 
small σ 
LHS with 
large σ 
Figure 1: Graphical representation of Equation (8'')   12
larger one being increased and the smaller one being reduced if ε is increased 
further. If ε is small, there may be no solution at all.  
 (enlarged version of the figure in the appendix) 
g* 
σ  1/α 
Figure 2: Comparative statics-effects on relative government expenditure, g * 
Figure 2, which follows directly from Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium value of g, g*, as 
a function of σ and shows what happens if ε  rises. The effect of a larger value of ε  on 
this function is shown by the dashed line. It is seen that in the case of two equilibria, 
one of the equilibrium values is increased whereas the other is reduced. Algebraically 
this follows from differentiating equation (8''): 
   ()
1 1
1
− − 




 −
−
=
α αδ
σ
α
α
ε g
F
d
dg
. (9) 
 (enlarged version of the figure in the appendix) 
(1-ε)F 
no 
solution 
one 
solution 
two 
solutions 
σ  1/α 
Figure 3: Bifurcation Diagram  
  Finally a bifurcation diagram in a (σ,ε) space can be drawn. See Figure 3. For 
σ=1/α, a first bifurcation occurs. To the left of this locus, there is only one equilibrium. 
To its right, a second equilibrium occurs. The second bifurcation locus depicts the   13
combinations of σ  and ε, for which we have tangency solutions, i.e. the transition from 
two equilibria to no equilibrium at all. This line is determined by
1 
  ()
1 1
1
1
1 1
− − 




 − = −
α
α
α
ασ
δ ε F . 
Thus, there is a variety of results, which are summarised in Proposition 2. Note that 
there is a monotonous relationship between the relative expenditure on innovation, g, 
and the rate of innovation, g
1-α. Thus, one can conclude. 
Proposition 2 
If the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is small, an increase in capital 
mobility reduces the rate of innovation and, thus, the growth rate of the 
economy. If the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is large, the impact of 
an increase in mobility is ambiguous.  
The critical value for the elasticity of substitution is the inverse of the innovation 
elasticity of the stock of innovations, 1/α , and this inverse is larger than one. Thus, σ  
must be considerably larger than one to generate multiple equilibrium innovation and 
growth rates. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that σ  is small. Hall (1988) 
derived estimates close to zero. A recent study by Guvenen (2005), which distinguishes 
between stockholders and non-stockholders, arrives at larger estimates for the aggregate 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution which are nevertheless smaller than one. Thus, 
although σ>1 is theoretically possible, it is unlikely to be an empirically relevant case. 
Therefore, one is driven to conclude that for realistic parameters of the model the rate of 
innovation is a declining function of interjurisdictional capital mobility. This is a typical 
                                                 
1   The locus can be derived by noting that in the tangency point the derivatives of the LHS and 
of the RHS of (8'') must be equal. Together with (8'') itself this generates a system of two 
equations in three variables, g,σ, and ε, of which g can be eliminated.   14
tax competition result. Like in the static models of tax competition, there tends to be an 
underprovision of public goods. See Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) for example and, 
for an overview, Wilson (1999). The intuition for the result is that an increased mobility 
of the tax base induces a tougher competition to attract this tax base. This induces too-
low taxes and less-than-optimal supply of public-sector services. In our model, the 
service provided by the public sector is innovation. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
tighter competition leads to less innovation.  
  Finally, I wish to address the question of the taming of the Leviathan. What is the 
impact of increased mobility and tougher competition on taxation and on the 
Leviathan's capability to appropriate rents out of the tax revenue? Using the CES 
properties of the utility function, the first-order condition (6c) can be rewritten such that 
   ( 1
1
− 





−
= − θ
ε
Ω
θ
σ
g
F )  (10) 
where  G K / Θ θ = . It is seen that, at a first glance, an increase in capital mobility, ε, 
seems to have the same effect on equation (9) as an increase in the weight of private 
welfare, Ω, in the Leviathan's objective function. However the change in the mobility 
parameter affects the rate of innovation, whereas the weight parameter doesn't. 
Algebraically, the impact of a change in ε  on θ  is: 
  
σ
σ
ε
Ω
ε ε
Ω
ε
θ
σ
ε
θ
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−
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1 1
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2 d
dg
g
F
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d
 (11) 
The denominator on the RHS is unambiguously positive. The first part of the numerator 
on the RHS is negative, the second part is positive since dg/dε  is negative for realistic   15
values of σ .
2 Thus, there are two opposing effects. The first one is a taming-of-the-
Leviathan effect which reduces the tax rate implemented to finance a given level of 
productive spending, G. The second effect points into the opposite direction and an 
interpretation can be derived via (6c). The reduction of productive spending due to 
fiscal externalities affects the Leviathan's rate of substitution such that the marginal 
utility of the rent is reduced compared to the marginal utility of political support. To 
reverse this effect, the Leviathan raises the tax rate. Note that this effect dominates if the 
weight of voter's welfare in the Leviathan's objective function, Ω , is small. Among 
other parameters, the elasticity of substitution plays an important role for the relative 
strength of the two effects that determine dθ/dε . If σ  is large, the taming-of-Leviathan 
effect dominates; if σ  is small, dθ/dε  can be positive and, contrary to intuition, more 
competition makes the government use a larger share of its budget for unproductive 
rent-seeking.  
Proposition 3 
If the elasticity of substitution between rent income and political support is 
large, then an increase in mobility reduces the tax- revenue productive-
expenditure ratio, i.e. the Leviathan government appropriates a smaller 
share of its tax revenue for its own consumption. The result is reversed if the 
elasticity of substitution is large. 
This result is closely related to that derived by Rauscher (2000) in a static model. If rent 
income and political support are good substitutes, the increase in the opportunity cost of 
appropriating rent income after an increase in the capital-flight elasticity makes the 
government substitute political support for rent income. If rent and political support are 
only weak substitutes, the change in the opportunity cost generates only a small 
                                                 
2   It should be noted that dg/dε , determined by equation (9), contains parameters such as α     16
substitution effect and the opposing effect via the reduction in g, which has been 
discussed above, dominates.  
 
5 Final remarks 
The paper has shown that the impact of increased factor mobility on the government's 
innovation effort is likely to be negative. Under special circumstances, the converse is 
also possible, but this can only occur only for unrealistically large values of the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Moreover, it has been shown that this possibility 
is closely related to multiple and vanishing equilibria.  
  The obvious shortcoming of the model is the asymmetry between private and 
public capital. Private capital was assumed to be constant in this paper, but governments 
were able to accumulate public-sector knowledge capital. This assumption is 
responsible for two rather unrealistic features of the model. Firstly, the public sector is 
the exclusive growth locomotive in this economy. And secondly, the rate of return to 
private capital goes to infinity along the growth path. Extensions of the model should 
therefore, endogenise the accumulation of private capital. This would imply that a 
second source of economic growth is introduced and, moreover, that the rate of return 
can be constant. There are two possibilities of endogenising capital accuulation. One of 
them is to assume that interjurisdictional movements of capital are costly but 
nevertheless possible with infinite speed. See Lejour and Verbon (1997) for such a 
model. I expect that the results derived in my model carry over to that class of models. 
The other way of looking at the issue of interjurisdictional capital movements assumes 
frictional costs that impede the rapid adjustment of capital to differences in the rates of 
return across jurisdictions. Wildasin (2003) introduced such frictional costs in a simpler 
                                                                                                                                               
and δ  that do not occur elsewhere on the right-hand side of equation (10).   17
dynamic model in which a constant steady state – rather than a balanced growth path – 
is approached in the long run. It is this latter type of models which is more realistic and, 
therefore, more promising. But this is also the more difficult and challenging task to 
extend these frictional-cost models into an economic-growth context. 
   18
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